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The Merit Selection Continuum
Joseph Larisa*
Constitutional Judicial Merit Selection was passed in
November 1994, the same day newly elected Governor Lincoln
Almond took office. It was also the same day Governor-elect
Almond hired me to serve as his Executive Counsel. A few years
later, I became Chief of Staff. In these roles, I was intimately
involved in the first eight years of merit selection, sitting through
over one hundred candidate interviews as the Governor and I met
with each candidate sent to us by the Judicial Nominating
Commission ("JNC") for every court vacancy in the Family,
District, Superior and Supreme Courts. Further, during the
infancy of merit selection, I brought on behalf of the Governor a
Supreme Court case vindicating the Governor's right to a "new
list" when the House or Senate announces a "de facto" rejection
without actually voting. My observations here stem from my
experience inside the State House for the first eight years of merit
selection and watching closely from outside the State House as a
private legal practitioner during the last eight years.
The process of merit selection has always been a continuum
with pure merit on one side and pure politics on the other. The
ideal of its framers was all merit and no politics - or at least
selection mostly on merit with little politics. This was to
represent a change from mostly politics and less merit, especially
with respect to the former Grand Committee Supreme Court
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selection process (where the entire House and Senate jointly
selected by majority vote of the combined houses), which was
controlled by the leadership in the larger House of
Representatives. When two branches of government are involved
in the process, however, no judicial selection system can ever be
completely devoid of politics. At the same time, it is almost
impossible to have a completely political system where someone is
picked by political sponsors for various reasons with absolutely no
merit. The goal, from the beginning of merit selection, was to
have the most merit and the least amount of politics in the
selection system.
To provide a vivid example of the ways politics had defined
judicial selection in Rhode Island prior to the enactment of merit
selection, consider the Almond Administration's first meeting with
House leadership to discuss judicial selection. During that
meeting, the Governor and I learned of an alleged "one, one, one"
agreement. As it was explained, the "one, one, one" agreement
provided that the Governor, the Senate, and the House each got to
pick one judicial nominee by turn. I joked with the leadership
that I was unable to find this policy in the statute. Of course, the
pertinent statutes did not in any way contemplate such an
arrangement. Consequently, Governor Almond, to his great
credit, and to the dismay of many key political figures,
disregarded the alleged "one, one, one" policy and never sought the
name of the preferred nominee from legislative leadership before
making any of his nominations.
With these types of political policies that defined judicial
selection in Rhode Island prior to the passage of the new system,
one can surely observe that the merit selection process is an
improvement. This is particularly true with respect to the
Supreme Court. After all, there is little closer to the completely
political side of the continuum than having the Speaker of the
House alone effectively picking the Supreme Court justices
through his voting control of the Grand Committee, as was the
case under the prior system. While there certainly was some
merit in some of those selections (with former Chief Justice
Weisberger's original selection to the Supreme Court being a
prime example), one can see how politics could play a predominant
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role in that process, as was addressed by John Marion.1 Changing
Supreme Court selection from Grand Committee to the JNC,
Governor and legislative advice and consent, therefore, is an
improvement.
In assessing the current merit selection system, a crucial
component for consideration is the application process. After all,
in order to get the best and brightest seated on the bench, Rhode
Island needs the best and the brightest to apply for judgeships.
As it has been alluded to throughout this Symposium, deciding to
apply to be on the court has been a very difficult decision over the
past fifteen years. As Mr. Carlotti mentioned in his presentation,
the application process is extremely arduous and demanding.
Indeed, the application requires a candidate to provide a plethora
of personal information. The level of detail demanded is
incredible, and requires the candidate to commit many hours to
reconstruct his or her life. This is just the beginning of the
difficulties. If the candidate is in private practice (and most are)
they usually will face difficulty in retaining current clients and
attracting new ones based upon an overarching concern that their
attorney may be promoted to the bench.
When applying for a judgeship, candidates have certain
expectations. First and foremost, applicants need to know that
they are going to be considered on their merits, for better or worse.
In due course, reasonable commissioners or the Governor may
disagree about whether an applicant is best for the position. In
my assessment, however, a fundamental problem has arisen in
the current system post-Almond Administration - that is, despite
the merit selection process in place, judicial applicants over the
last few years have needed a political sponsor in the
administration or in the legislative leadership in order to have
success in the process. The perception and, to a large extent, the
reality is that the "one, one, one" deal alluded to earlier, whereby
the Governor, the House and the Senate each take turns for
judicial selections, is back in effect.
This problem is so pervasive that many prospective applicants
who lack a "political godfather (or godmother)" have refused to
apply, believing that doing so would be a waste of time and effort.
1. See John Marion, Judging How We Pick Judges: Fifteen Years of
Merit Selection in Rhode Island, 15 ROGER WILIAMS U. L. REV. 735 (2010).
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This problem severely frustrates the goal of getting the best and
the brightest to apply and eventually be appointed to the courts.
Although, as highlighted earlier, the merit selection process has
brought about some beneficial change, this is an area where
politics triumphs over merit and as such, cries out for
improvement. The improvement, however, lies not within the
rules, but rather those governmental actors who implement them.
There is an important distinction to be made. Up to this
point, I have addressed the "merit selection" system in place
today. In my view the system itself accomplishes about half the
goal of ensuring that the best and the brightest lawyers serve in
the judiciary. Accomplishing the other half of the goal, I suggest,
requires looking to the actors implementing the system. There
may be a tremendous republic or democratic system in place with
terrible elected leadership or, conversely, a dictatorship with the
benevolent leader who is just and fulfills the needs of his people.
In one, the system is sound but the leaders are poor, and in the
other the system is flawed but its leadership is sound. Similarly,
the merit selection system may be great in theory, but the process
may fall short because the members of the Commission, the
Governor, or the leadership of the House or Senate have a
different agenda than pure merit selection. The point is that the
greatest system in the world will not work if the people
implementing it act inconsistent with its goals. If you have
players committed to merit selection, however, and they strive to
keep the politics out, the system in place is designed to let politics
stay out.
To further keep politics out of the selection process, the
Commission should reconsider a ban on ex parte communications
with outsiders that the Almond Administration proposed, but was
defeated on a 4-4 vote in 2001. The Handbook for Judicial
Nominating Commissioners published by the American
Judicature Society advocates for such a rule and there is no sound
reason it should not be the law in Rhode Island.2  All
recommendations for or against any applicant should be heard by
the entire Commission (in the form of letters and/or testimony)
2. MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, HANDBOOK FOR
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 10-12 (Kathleen M. Sampson ed.)
(2004).
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and not an individual member in off the record comments, or even
worse, in the form of lobbying by the legislature. Indeed, one
member of the Commission routinely brought in a list of names
provided by the leadership listing for whom he was to vote. In
addition, those outside the process frequently contact Commission
members to support or oppose certain candidates. This type of
nominating politics has no place in merit selection. Either all ex
parte communications should be outlawed, or at a minimum, each
should be disclosed to all Commission members.
In a final note, I would like to address briefly the issue
relating to the time the Governor has to make a final judicial
appointment once a list has been provided from the Judicial
Nominating Commission. I was the one who offered the legal
opinion that the Governor's time limits proscribed by statute were
advisory and not mandatory. That opinion, however, was never
intended to give the Governor unlimited time; rather, even an
advisory statute requires good faith in its execution and a valid
reason to be given for extending the deadline.
Many circumstances for extension on what was then a very
short deadline may be valid. For example, the Governor may be
unable to interview all the prospective candidates in time. In this
case, it seems logical that the statute would be advisory, granting
the Governor additional time for consideration. Likewise, when
the legislature is out of session near the end of the year and would
not return until January, it is reasonable not to rush a decision
since the nomination would not be taken up for an extended
period regardless of the date it was made.
Post-Almond Administration, however, the Governor has
entirely disregarded the statutory time proscriptions and,
seemingly without justification, has taken many months (and even
a year) to nominate a judge. Clearly this is problematic. Going
forward, in order to clear up this ambiguity, I recommend that the
legislature enact a statute clarifying that the Governor's time
limit for consideration is mandatory, and not advisory, unless good
cause is shown.
In summation, my opinion is that the current judicial
selection system is an improvement over its predecessor
(especially with the end to the Grand Committee), but I believe
that much work still needs to be done to move the system more
toward merit and less toward politics.
